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It is well established that the Sherman Act' prohibits unreasonable re-
straints of trade, and that its purpose is to promote competition. 2 Histori-
cally, courts have analyzed allegedly anticompetitive conduct in terms of
economic factors, judging the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a re-
straint by its effect on the commercial marketplace.'
In recent years, courts have begun to address the question of how to apply
the antitrust laws to nonprofit organizations and other entities which, al-
though they operate in the commercial marketplace, assert "noneconomic"
justifications for their behavior. This question is becoming increasingly im-
portant to the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") and
similar amateur sports organizations. Such groups frequently engage in ac-
tivities which, if engaged in by most commercial competitors, could be
deemed illegal per se.4
t This article is adapted from a presentation made at the March 1985 Conference on
Antitrust and Amateur Sports sponsored by the Center for Law and Sports of Indiana University.
The authors thankfully acknowledge the contributions made by Tori T. Matton in the prepa-
ration of this article.
* B.A. 1972, Louisiana State University; J.D. 1979, Georgetown University Law Center;
Associate, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C.
** B.A. 1979, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1984, Northwestern University School of Law;
Associate, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1983).
2. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
3. Conduct deemed to be inherently anticompetitive, such as price-fixing, horizontal market
division, or group boycotts, is illegal per se. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446
U.S. 643 (1980); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207 (1959); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). Other allegedly anticompetitive conduct is sub-
jected to a "rule of reason" analysis, in which the pro- and anticompetitive effects of the re-
straint are weighed to determine its reasonableness. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); see also infra notes 6-24 and accompanying
text.
4. For example, amateur sports organizations arguably engage in price-fixing by placing
limitations on the compensation of student athletes and regulating athletic scholarships. By
restricting the numbers of coaches, and setting playing rules and schedules, they arguably
facilitate market division. In addition, the enforcement of these and other rules through the
exclusion of nonconforming member institutions can be viewed as a group boycott. See Koch,
A Troubled Cartel: The NCAA, 38 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 135 (1973).
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Nevertheless, in most circumstances it just does not seem proper to treat
amateur sports organizations like commercial, profit-making enterprises. The
organizations themselves are nonprofit, and have legitimate noncommercial
goals. For example, these organizations are dedicated to the preservation of
amateurism, decreasing the incentive for powerful college teams to "go
professional." The NCAA and other similar organizations are composed of
colleges and universities whose primary mission is the education of students;
these organizations arguably help to uphold the academic standards of such
institutions by maintaining admissions standards and preventing the drain
of funds from educational programs which might accompany the "profes-
sionalization" of college athletics. Moreover, some of the rules promulgated
by amateur sports organizations are designed to protect the health and safety
of athletes. Such noneconomic factors, along with the fact that these or-
ganizations provide a means for accomplishing the laudable goal of self-
regulation, are arguably relevant in any antitrust analysis.
A court faced with the question of how to apply the antitrust laws to the
activities of amateur sports organizations can take one of three approaches:
(1) that noneconomic or "noncommercial" factors are not relevant at all;
(2) that they justify a total exemption from the antitrust laws; or (3) that
they justify application of the rule of reason in cases which would otherwise
be subject to a per se test of illegality. In addition, if the court applies the
rule of reason, it must determine what, if any, weight to give to noneconomic
factors.
Although it was generally assumed prior to 1970 that noncommercial
activities were entitled to a total exemption from the antitrust laws, cases
decided over the past two decades clearly show that the existence of non-
commercial goals will not totally shield the NCAA or any other amateur
sports organization from antitrust liability. The relevant question, therefore,
is to what extent, if any, courts will take noneconomic factors into account
in applying the per se rule or the rule of reason. This article addresses how
the federal courts have approached this question, and how the judicial
approach in the future may be affected by the United States Supreme Court's
1984 decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,'
in which the Supreme Court held that the NCAA's television regulations
violated the Sherman Act. After a brief overview in section I of the courts'
historical approach to application of the per se rule versus the rule of reason,
section II analyzes Supreme Court precedent on the relevance of noneconomic
For a general discussion of antitrust issues arising in the amateur sports context, see J. WEISTART
& C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS (1979); Weistart, Antitrust Issues in the Regulation of
College Sports, J. COLL. & U.L. 77 (1977); Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust
Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655 (1978).
5. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984). See infra notes 93-121 and accompanying text.
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values to antitrust analysis in other (i.e., non-sports) contexts. Section III
then traces the pre-NCAA cases involving amateur sports organizations.
Finally, sections IV and V discuss the lower court and Supreme Court
decisions in NCAA and the potential impact of that case on the application
of the antitrust laws to amateur sports.
I. PER SE V. RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS
Because every contract can in some sense be considered a restraint of
trade, the Sherman Act prohibits only "unreasonable restraints.' '6 The start-
ing point for analyzing whether conduct unreasonably restrains trade in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act is to determine the appropriate
test for legality: should the conduct be subject to the per se rule of illegality
or to rule of reason analysis? If the challenged conduct is likely, in most
cases, to cause substantial injury to competition, and further inquiry into
its injurious effect on competition would be complex, time-consuming, costly,
and ultimately uncertain, then courts will invoke the per se doctrine and
find the conduct illegal without engaging in further analysis. A rule of per
se illegality has been applied to certain categories of conduct which are
"plainly anticompetitive. '1 7 Examples of per se illegal restraints include price-
fixing agreements,8 group boycotts, 9 horizontal divisions of markets between
competitors, 0 and resale price maintenance."
Other forms of concerted action, however, cannot be and are not so easily
categorized as patently anticompetitive. Such conduct is subject to rule of
reason analysis and is held illegal only if "it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition."'' 2 Under the rule of reason, courts examine the
6. 104 S. Ct. at 2959 (1984); Cha-Car, Inc. v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 752 F.2d 609,
612 (l1th Cir. 1985).
7. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979); Catalano,
Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 646 (1980).
8. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (fee schedule
fixing maximum price is per se illegal); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc. 446 U.S. 643, 648
(1980) (elimination of short-term trade credit to wholesalers constitutes per se illegal price-
fixing); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (major oil refiners'
concerted program to purchase distressed gasoline to prop up market price constitutes per se
illegal price-fixing).
9. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 214-18 (1959) (agreement
not to sell to individual retailer constituted group boycott subject to per se rule); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1945) (joint newspaper venture cannot expressly
prohibit all transactions with non-members).
10. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606-12 (1972) (market division
arrangement imposed by subsidiary to allow small independent grocers to better compete with
national chains held per se illegal, despite enhanced competition).
11. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968) (vertical agreements aimed at
establishing maximum resale prices are per se illegal); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13,
16 (1964) (sham consignment resulting in vertical price restraints held per se illegal).
12. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
1985]
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challenged conduct to determine its purpose and likely effects on competition.
They then balance the conduct's pro- and anticompetitive effects to determine
its legality. 3
Recently, courts have been more reluctant to apply the per se rule auto-
matically to seemingly anticompetitive activity. Rather, they have carved out
exceptions to the per se rule where there is evidence that either the nature
of the industry or the form of the restraint might justify the conclusion that
the challenged conduct is not anticompetitive.'
The doctrine of ancillary restraints is the earliest example of a court-
fashioned exception which permits courts to uphold otherwise per se illegal
restraints.15 Under this doctrine, restraints on competition are permissible if
they are merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract and are
necessary to protect the promisee's enjoyment of his rights under the contract.
An example of a legitimate ancillary restraint is an employee's covenant not
to compete which is necessary to protect the employer's valuable trade secrets,
confidential customer information, or right to access to the employee's
unique services. 6
Other exceptions to the per se rule relate to the nature of the industry
involved. Courts have been unwilling, for example, to apply the per se rule
when dealing with an unfamiliar industry. 7 In Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System,' the Supreme Court held that the rule of
reason should be applied to a joint venture under which copyright holders
joined together to grant only "blanket" music performance licenses, even
though "the blanket license involve[d] 'price fixing' in the literal sense."' 9
The Court found that the venture was not per se illegal because the blanket
licenses were nonexclusive, i.e., individual copyright owners could grant
individual licenses. 20 Furthermore, the agreement on price was necessary to
market the "blanket" license as a separate and unique product. 2'
13. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 232 (1982); National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596
(1972).
14. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 21-25
(1979) (because a joint selling arrangement left open the possibility of individual competition
with a concomitant increase in output, it did not violate the Sherman Act).
15. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), modified
and aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
16. See generally Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HAuv. L. REV. 625
(1960).
17. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979);
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972).
18. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
19. Id. at 8.
20. Id. at 24.
21. Id. at 23.
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By contrast, most conduct required by or intended to influence public
legislation or regulation is entirely exempt from the antitrust laws. This
includes otherwise anticompetitive conduct intended to influence the passage
or enforcement of laws. 22 Conduct mandated by a state or federal regulatory
scheme which conflicts with the federal antitrust laws is also exempt. 23 Courts
also have recognized the need for private regulation of standards, quality,
and practices. 24
II. THE RELEVANCE OF NONECONOMIC VALUES TO ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS IN NON-SPORTS CONTEXTS
The Supreme Court has been less than clear in its guidance with respect
to the relative merit of noneconomic values in antitrust analysis. In early
cases, the Supreme Court emphasized that the antitrust laws were designed
to regulate commercial activity and suggested that instances could arise in
which the noncommercial aspects of anticompetitive conduct would exempt
that conduct from antitrust scrutiny. 2 At the same time, the Supreme Court
recognized that "nonprofit" and "noncommercial" are not synonymous.
26
It is now beyond question that nonprofit status alone does not confer an
exemption for anticompetitive conduct.
27
22. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Co., 365 U.S. 127,
136-38 (1961) (publicity campaign designed to foster adoption and retention of laws and law
enforcement practices destructive of the trucking business exempt from antitrust laws); United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965) (concerted effort to influence
Secretary of Labor did not violate antitrust laws despite intent to eliminate competition).
23. See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357-61 (1963) (stock exchange
rules mandated by federal securities laws partially exempt from Sherman Act); Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341, 368 (1943) (regulation of state industry of local concern exempt from antitrust
laws).
24. See Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 653 (5th Cir. 1977) (system
of standardized registration rules necessary to maintain integrity of the breed, therefore not
anticompetitive on its face); Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165, 170 (9th
Cir.) (strict membership requirements necessary to promote athletic competition and to limit
number of contestants in any one tournament), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
25. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959)
("the [Sherman] Act is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives and is
applied only to a very limited extent to organizations, like labor unions, which normally have
other objectives"); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (anticompetitive union
activity to further legitimate union goals of raising wages and improving working conditions
held exempt from antitrust laws); Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League
of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (baseball entitled to an exemption
from the Sherman Act because "personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of
commerce").
26. See American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943) (Group Health
was "engaged in business or trade" for purposes of the Sherman Act despite its nonprofit,
cooperative nature).
27. In American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982), a
nonprofit society of engineers was held liable under the antitrust laws for the acts of its agents
1985]
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Given the lack of an exemption for nonprofit status alone, the more
difficult question becomes to what extent noncommercial values such as
safety and ethical norms may be taken into account in antitrust analysis.
Although early Supreme Court cases suggested the possibility that the profes-
sions should be exempt from the antitrust laws,28 recent Supreme Court
decisions suggest that ethical rules which limit competition between members
of the same profession or which restrain the professional's participation in
another area of commerce are subject to antitrust scrutiny. In Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 29 the Court struck down a state bar association rule which
prescribed a minimum fee schedule for legal services. The bar association
argued that it was exempt from the antitrust laws because it was not in
trade or commerce. 30 The Court rejected this argument, concluding that
"[t]he nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary
from the Sherman Act .... nor is the public-service aspect of professional
practice controlling in determining whether § 1 includes professions."', How-
ever, the Court qualified its conclusion in its oft-cited footnote seventeen,
leaving open the possibility of a "public service" defense:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished
from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that
particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to
view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business
activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts
which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other
features of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which
performed with apparent authority. And in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332 (1982), the Court found that a nonprofit foundation which set a maximum fee schedule
committed a per se violation of section I of the Sherman Act. See generally Note, Antitrust
and Nonprofit Entities, 94 HARv. L. REV. 802 (1981).
28. For example, in United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952), the Court
recognized a distinction between the professions and "ordinary commercial matters," noting
that "forms of competition usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical
standards of a profession." Id. at 336 (citations omitted). The Court noted that the defendants,
which included eight county medical societies and a doctor-sponsored corporation engaged in
the sale of prepaid medical care, "may engage in activities which violate the antitrust laws."
Id. at 334.
In Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970), the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit refused to apply the Sherman Act to
the allegedly anticompetitive conduct of a regional accrediting association, stating that "the
proscriptions of the Sherman Act were 'tailored ... for the business world,' not for the
noncommercial aspects of the liberal arts and the learned professions." Id. at 654 (quoting
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 141 (1961)).
Although the Marjorie Webster decision suggested the possibility of an "educational exception"
which could be applied to activities of the NCAA, subsequent decisions have declined to fashion
a blanket exemption for educational institutions. See generally Kirby, Federal Antitrust Issues
Affecting Institutions of Higher Education: An Overview, 11 J. COLL. & U.L. 345 (1984).
29. 421 U.S. 773 (1976).
30. Id. at 787.
31. Id. (citation omitted).
[Vol. 61:31
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could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently.
2
Thus Goldfarb suggests that even though noncommercial objectives may not
exempt anticompetitive conduct from scrutiny under the Sherman Act, they
might justify rule of reason analysis rather than the per se approach.
The Goldfarb decision was significantly limited by the Court's later de-
cision in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States.33 In
Professional Engineers, the Society's code of ethics prohibited engineers from
competing with each other on the basis of price. The Society justified this
restraint by claiming that it minimized the risk that competition would
produce inferior engineering services endangering public safety. 4 The Court
rejected the Society's "public safety" argument, taking a limited view of
the relevance of noncommercial concerns: "[T]he cautionary footnote in
Goldfarb ... cannot be read as fashioning a broad exemption under the
Rule of Reason for learned professions." 3 The Court stated that a rule of
reason inquiry is limited to the impact of the challenged activity on com-
petition, and such an inquiry "does not support a defense based on the
assumption that competition itself is unreasonable. 3 6 Thus, Professional
Engineers suggests that while professional self-regulation may appropriately
be analyzed under the rule of reason, proffered noncommercial considera-
tions may not be weighed in the balance.
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 37 the Court distinguished
Goldfarb and Professional Engineers in applying the per se rule to a medical
society's maximum fee schedule. Although the Court recognized the defend-
ant's professional status, it noted that the defendant could not argue "that
the quality of the professional service that their members provide [was]
enhanced" by its otherwise anticompetitive activity or that the price restraints
had anything to do with "public service or ethical norms.''38 Thus, the
Maricopa decision suggests that only those activities of the professions or
other "noncommercial" entities that are directly supported by public service
or ethical considerations will be treated more leniently under the antitrust
laws.
32. Id. at 788 n.17.
33. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
34. Id. at 684-85.
35. Id. at 696.
36. Id. The Court did suggest, however, that ethical norms which regulate and promote
competition without having an anticompetitive effect-such as marketing restraints resulting
from a seller's concern for safety-may fall within the rule of reason. Id. at n.22. Lower courts
have interpreted this ambiguous language to mean that public interest considerations are ir-
relevant to a rule of reason analysis. See NCAA, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2978 (1984) (White, J.,
dissenting), aff'g 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'g in part, remanding in part, 546 F. Supp.
1276 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
37. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
38. Id. at 349.
19851
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At most, these Supreme Court cases suggest that conduct which would
otherwise be held per se illegal may be analyzed under the rule of reason
when it is directly related to legitimate noncommercial considerations. Prior
to the Supreme Cburt's decision in NCAA, lower courts had adopted this
general rule, finding that group boycotts or refusals to deal based on non-
commerical goals either were not per se illegal or were lawful under a rule
of reason analysis.39
III. PRE-NCAA LOWER COURT CASES APPLYINlG THE
ANTITRUST LAWS TO AMATEUR SPORTS
Prior to 1977, lower courts followed the pattern established by the Supreme
Court in non-sports cases and generally refused to apply the Sherman Act
at all to the allegedly anticompetitive conduct of amateur sports associations.
For example, in Jones v. NCAA, 40 the district court upheld an NCAA rule
making ineligible any college athlete receiving compensation, concluding that
the Sherman Act was inapplicable because no marketplace "competition"
was involved.4' After the Court's Goldfarb decision, 42 however, most lower
courts began consistently to apply the rule of reason to the allegedly anti-
39. See, e.g., Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 221 (7th Cir. 1983) (refusal
to deal based on patient care motive required application of rule of reason rather than per se
rule), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2398 (1984); Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297,
1299-300 (9th Cir. 1979) (rule prohibiting players with vision in only one eye from playing was
intended to promote safety, therefore per se rule did not apply); Kruezer v. American Academy
of Periodontology, 558 F. Supp. 683, 684-85 (D.D.C. 1983) (regulations limiting membership
to those who worked full-time in specialty served noncommercial purpose, therefore justifying
application of rule of reason); see also Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n,
665 F.2d 222, 223 (8th Cir. 1981) (rule of reason applied to actions of private, nonprofit reg-
ulating body's ban of certain type of tennis racket from use in sanctioned tournament); Veizaga
v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,274, at 70,870 (N.D.
III. 1977) (court should apply rule of reason if it finds activity to be noncommercial).
40. 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
41. Id. at 303. See Kupec v. Atlantic Coast Conference, 399 F. Supp. 1377, 1380-81
(M.D.N.C. 1975) (court denied injunctive relief against rule limiting participation in any sport
to four years over a consecutive five-year period, noting that conference should be free to
regulate in order to accomplish noncommercial objectives of promoting intercollegiate athletics
and strengthening the student athlete's physical condition and moral fiber); College Athletic
Placement Serv., Inc. v. NCAA, 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,117, at 65,267 (D.N.J.), aff'd,
506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974) (court held that a NCAA rule precluding students who used an
athletic placement service from college eligibility "does not come within the purview of the
Sherman Act"); see also Samara v. NCAA, 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,536, at 94,384 (E.D.
Va. 1973) (court refused to apply Sherman Act to eligibility rule precluding athletes who
participated in uncertified track and field events from competing in intercollegiate competition,
finding that plaintiff failed to establish any injury); Amateur Softball Ass'n of America v.
United States, 467 F.2d 312, 314-15 (10th Cir. 1972) (despite finding that baseball exemption
did not apply to softball, court did not decide whether amateur sports were entitled to an
antitrust exemption or were engaged in commerce). See generally Note, National Collegiate
Athletic Association's Certification Requirement: A Section 1 Violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, 9 VAL. U.L. REV. 193 (1974).
42. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1976); see supra notes 28-31 and accom-
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competitive conduct of amateur sports organizations, although often with
little or no explanation.43
In Hennessey v. NCAA," the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit specifically rejected the application of the per se rule to the
activities of the NCAA.4 1 In Hennessey, two assistant coaches challenged a
bylaw limiting the number of assistant coaches a member school could employ
at any one time. 46 The NCAA claimed that its status as a voluntary nonprofit
organization with educational objectives and activites exempted it from scru-
tiny under the Sherman Act. 47 Relying on Goldfarb, the court held that the
NCAA was not exempt from antitrust regulations on this ground, 4 and
proceeded to analyze the challenged bylaw under the rule of reason. 49
In Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc. v. American Broadcasting
Co.,5 0 a cable company sought a preliminary injunction to restrain a com-
mercial television network and the NCAA from implementing a plan to
prevent the cable company from televising football games not televised by
the commercial network. The defendants asserted that the plan promoted
educationally important athletic events and limited profit maximization in
college sports, thus fostering amateurism. Denying the preliminary injunc-
tion, the court noted that the rule of reason was the proper standard for
examining the challenged plan because the plan did not arise in a "purely
panying text.
43. See infra notes 44-55 and accompanying text. For example, in Tondas v. Amateur
Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 310 (W.D.N.Y. 1977), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
unreasonably restrained and monopolized trade and commerce in amateur hockey. The defend-
ant moved for summary judgment, asserting that it was exempt from the antitrust laws as a
nonprofit athletic association formed to promote amateur athletics. Id. at 313. The district
court denied summary judgment, noting that "a non-profit athletic association formed for the
purpose of promoting amateur athletics ... may be found to be engaging in conduct which
results in an unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce," and that "an exemption for amateur
athletics is unwarranted." Id. at 313-14. Thus, the court concluded that "[a]greements entered
into by an amateur athletic association which restrict the activities of an amateur team should
be judged by the rule of reason." Id. at 314.
Similarly, in Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 561 P.2d 499, 507-08 (Okla.
1977), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma overturned the trial court's finding that an NCAA
bylaw which limited the number of coaches that a NCAA Division I member could employ
was per se illegal, without any detailed analysis of its reasons.
44. 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
45. Id. at 1151.
46. This is the same bylaw that was at issue in the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in
Univ. of Okla., 561 P.2d 499. See supra note 43.
47. 564 F.2d at 1148.
48. Id. at 1148-49.
49. Id. at 1151. As part of its rule of reason analysis, the court in Hennessey took into
account the NCAA's asserted noncommercial goal of preserving and fostering competition in
intercollegiate athletics and found that the bylaw was not an unreasonable restraint. Id. at
1154. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Professional Engineers, however, it was difficult
to determine what, if any, weight should be given to noncommercial values in a rule of reason
analysis of allegedly anticompetitive conduct by amateur sports organizations. See supra notes
32-38 and accompanying text.
50. 499 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
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commercial" context, but rather in the context of a "singularly integrated
commercial and educational activity with which no court has considerable
experience."'-
In Justice v. NCAA, 52 four members of a university's football team sought
a preliminary injunction to prevent the NCAA from enforcing sanctions
which rendered the football team ineligible to participate in post-season
competition or to make television appearances for two seasons. The NCAA
defended the sanctions as necessary to preserve amateurism in intercollegiate
athletics. 53 Upholding the NCAA sanctions under a rule of reason analysis,
the court noted that:
[a] clear trend has emerged in recent years under which courts have been
extremely reluctant to subject the rules and regulations of sports orga-
nizations to the group boycott per se analysis. This trend is "[b]ased in
part upon the realization that in some sporting enterprises a few rules
are essential to survival." 4
The court recognized that the NCAA was engaged in two distinct kinds of
rulemaking activity: "One type, exemplified by the rules in Hennessey and
Jones, is rooted in the NCAA's concern for the protection of amateurism;
the other type is increasingly accompanied by a discernible economic pur-
pose. ' 5 5 Because the challenged sanctions had no anticompetitive purpose,
were reasonably related to the noncommercial goal of preserving amateurism,
and were not overbroad, the court held that they did not unreasonably
restrain trade.16
Thus, most lower courts analyzing the activites of amateur sports orga-
nizations prior to the Supreme Court's NCAA decision either refused to
apply the antitrust laws at all, or upheld the challenged activities under the
rule of reason. Those courts that explained their decisions noted that the
challenged activites lacked an anticompetitive purpose, were directly related
to legitimate noncommercial goals, and did not have a significant anticom-
petitive impact on competition. In the NCAA case, however, the courts
addressed a NCAA rule which had both discernible economic purpose and
a significant impact on competition, and which arguably was less directly
51. Id. at 545.
52. 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983).
53. Id. at 361.
54. Id. at 380 (quoting Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d 445, 454-55 (2d Cir.
1982); Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1977)).
55. Id. at 383.
56. Id. Cf. Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. NCAA, 735 F.2d 557
(D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'g 558 F. Supp. 487 (D.D.C. 1983) (AIA WV). In AIA W, the court applied
the rule of reason because of the NCAA's and the AIAW's status as eleemosynary organizations,
and found no antitrust violations. Citing Professional Engineers, the court indicated that the
legality of a challenged practice would depend on the necessity and legitimacy of the asserted
noncommercial goals and on the extent of the anticompetitive impact. 735 F.2d at 583-84. The
court noted that "achieving [an] essential noncommercial objective may justify some anticom-
petitive impact." Id. at 584 n.8 (citations omitted).
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related to legitimate noneconomic goals. The following section discusses how
the courts applied the antitrust laws to condemn this rule.
IV. THE NCAA CASE
In NCAA,17 the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia contended that
the NCAA's television plan and its underlying contracts with televion net-
works violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act." The television plan
at issue in NCAA empowered the NCAA to negotiate exclusive football
television contracts with broadcast networks for the 1982-1985 football sea-
sons.5 9 Under the plan, the NCAA granted to ABC, CBS, and Turner
Broadcasting the exclusive rights to negotiate with NCAA colleges for the
right to televise their games. 6° The plan and contracts limited the number
of games the networks could televise, the number of appearances by any
one team, and the amount of money a school could demand for televising
its games. The plan also required the networks to televise a certain number
of games between small colleges and prohibited individual institutions from
contracting separately to televise their games. 6' Plaintiffs raised four antitrust
theories in challenging the NCAA plan: price fixing, horizontal limitations
on production, group boycott, and monopolization. 62
A. The Lower Court Decisions
The district and appellate courts concluded that the NCAA plan and
57. 546 F. Supp. 1276 (,V.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 707 F.2d 1147
(10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984). See generally Note, Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: Antitrust Violations in
College Football, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 207 (1984); Note, Board of Regents of the University
of Oklahoma v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Application of the Per Se Rule to
Price-Fixing Agreements, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 185 (1983).
58. This litigation was triggered by the unsuccessful efforts of the College Football Asso-
ciation (CFA), an organization of the more dominant football playing schools and conferences,
to obtain for its members a greater voice in NCAA television policy-specifically, more network
appearances and more money per appearance. 546 F. Supp. at 1285-86; 104 S. Ct. at 2957.
59. 546 F. Supp. at 1291; 707 F.2d at 1150; 104 S. Ct. at 2957.
60. 546 F. Supp. at 1291-92; 707 F.2d at 1150; 104 S. Ct. at 2957.
61. 546 F. Supp. at 1291-93; 707 F.2d at 1150; 104 S. Ct. at 2956-57.
62. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the NCAA had: (1) fixed prices by setting a
"minimum aggregate fee" to be paid by networks for the right to telecast NCAA games, setting
specific fees for national and regional telecasts, and by granting the carrying network the
exclusive right to negotiate with NCAA schools to broadcast their games; (2) limited production
of televised college football by granting networks exclusive national television rights and severely
restricting local broadcasts; (3) engaged in a group boycott of networks not given exclusive
rights to broadcast as well as a threatened boycott of schools who entered into television
contracts not in accord with the NCAA plan; and (4) monopolized the market for televised
college football. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1293-97.
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network contracts were per se violations of the Sherman Act.' At the outset,
the district court characterized college football as "big business" and rejected
the NCAA's contention that the noneconomic goals of the NCAA and its
member institutions entitled the NCAA to special treatment under the an-
titrust laws:
[I]t is cavil to suggest that college football, or indeed higher education
itself, is not a business. The colleges of the nation are in competition
for students, for faculty, for government grants, and for philanthropic
support. It is a big business and millions of dollars are involved. The
same is true of college football. . .. Like any business, the schools which
play intercollegiate football seek to maximize revenue and minimize ex-
pense while at the same time maintaining the level of quality which makes
their product attractive to the buying public.'
Both lower courts agreed that the NCAA had literally fixed prices. The
district court stated, however, that "the fact of literal price-fixing does not
necessarily result in a finding of per se illegality." 61 Relying on Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 66 both lower courts noted
that "if the activity increases efficiency and renders the market more com-
petitive, it is not the type of activity which constitutes per se price-fixing. "6
The NCAA argued that its television plan was analogous to the marketing
scheme of the composer defendants in Broadcast Music in that the NCAA
was a "joint venture" and member cooperation was necessary to market its
product; thus, the per se rule was inappropriate. The lower courts rejected
this argument for a variety of reasons. 68 The district court reasoned that,
unlike the controls in Broadcast Music, the NCAA television restraints were
not necessary to protect NCAA members' rights and their ability to sell their
football games to networks. 69 To the contrary, the evidence indicated that
both national networks and local stations would buy the right to televise
many individual football games, and that more games would be televised in
a free market than were televised under NCAA controls.7 0 Moreover, both
lower courts stressed that the marketing arrangement in Broadcast Music
did not prevent individual composers from independently marketing their
broadcast rights, whereas the NCAA prohibited its members from entering
into television contracts with any network other than those with which the
NCAA had contracted. 71
63. 546 F. Supp. at 1308-09; 707 F.2d at 1156.
64. 546 F. Supp. at 1288-89.
65. Id. at 1305.
66. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
67. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1305 (citing Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 21); accord NCAA,
707 F. 2d at 1152. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of Broadcast
Music.
68. See generally 546 F. Supp. at 1306-08; 707 F.2d at 1153-56.
69. 546 F. Supp. at 1306.
70. Id. at 1307; 707 F.2d at 1156.
71. 546 F. Supp. at 1308; 707 F.2d at 1156.
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The NCAA also argued that rule of reason analysis was proper because
its television controls had procompetitive features: they protected the gate
attendance of NCAA members and they tended to preserve a competitive
balance among the football programs of the various schools. 72 The district
court rejected both arguments, stating that the evidence failed to show either
that television football reduced gate attendance,73 or that competitive balance
could not be maintained "without NCAA acting as the exclusive bargaining
agent for its members." ' 74 In the district court's view, "NCAA regulations
on recruitment, the limitations on the number of scholarships each team
may award, and the other standards for preserving amateurism ... [were]
sufficient to achieve this goal."7 - Accordingly, both the district court and
the appellate court concluded that under the Supreme Court's decision in
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,7 6 the per se rule could be
applied, even though the NCAA alleged procompetitive justifications for its
television plan. 77
Finally, the NCAA argued that the "ancillary restraint" doctrine prevented
the application of the per se rule because the television controls were directly
related to the NCAA's overall regulatory duty.78 The district court agreed
that the NCAA regulations had legitimate noneconomic goals, such as pre-
serving amateurism and competitive balance in college athletics. Nevertheless,
the court found the ancillary restraint doctrine inapplicable because the
NCAA had failed to present any credible evidence to show how its television
plan was necessary to achieve these goals. 79 Although the Tenth Circuit did
not directly address this argument, it took a narrower view of the role of
noneconomic justifications in discussing the NCAA's argument that the
television controls promoted athletically balanced competition. Relying on
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,80 the court
appeared to reject the NCAA's noneconomic justifications out of hand:
[T]his appears on its face to be a noneconomic justification. Noneconomic
considerations, however worthy, cannot be used to justify restraints that
adversely affect competition .... Furthermore, as the district court noted,
the argument that the restraints are necessary to promote athletic balance
72. 546 F. Supp. at 1295-96; 707 F.2d at 1154.
73. 546 F. Supp. at 1295-96.
74. Id. at 1296.
75. Id.
76. 457 U.S. 332 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
77. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1308; 707 F.2d at 1156 n.15. Additionally, the NCAA urged
application of the rule of reason because it was a voluntary association whose television policies
were implemented through a democratic process. The district court summarily rejected this
argument, noting that the NCAA was not "voluntary" in any meaningful way, and that even
if it were, this fact would have no significance under the antitrust laws. 546 F. Supp. at 1308-
09. This argument was not addressed by the court of appeals.
78. 546 F. Supp. at 1309.
79. Id. at 1309-10.
80. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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shades into the argument that competition will destroy the market ...
The Sherman Act will not countenance an argument that the nature of
a product or an industry structure is such that something other than
competition is desirable. . . . And, even if we assume the justification
to be legitimate, the district court found on adequate evidence that any
contribution the plan made to athletic balance could be achieved by less
restrictive means.8
Having found the television controls to be per se illegal, both the district
and appellate courts nevertheless performed a rule of reason analysis as well
and held that the controls were unreasonable. In doing so, the district court
focused on the commerical purpose and nature of the television regulations,
distinguishing Hennessey v. NCAA12 and other lower court decisions that
had upheld "noncommercial" NCAA regulations:
The Court would agree ... that the NCAA regulations at issue in those
cases were valid under the Rule of Reason. However, none of these cases
dealt with the commercial activities of NCAA. These activities are far
different from regulations governing the size of coaching staffs or rules
on academic eligibility. There is only a tenuous relationship between such
non-commercial regulations and the marketplace. Moreover, the non-
commercial regulations relate more directly and effectively to the pres-
ervation of competitive balance.
In this case, the commercial activities of NCAA have a direct and substantial
anti-competitive effect on the marketplace, and contribute only indirectly,
if at all, to the legitimate non-commercial goals of NCAA.
8 3
Both courts repeated their earlier conclusions that the restraints were
overbroad and not necessary to accomplish the procompetitive goals of the
NCAA, i.e., protection of gate attendance and preservation of competitive
balance between schools.
8 4
The district court also found for plaintiffs on their boycott and monopoly
claims. The court held that the NCAA's exclusive contracts were tantamount
to a group boycott of other potential broadcasters and that the NCAA's
threat of sanctions against its own members constituted a threatened boycott
of potential competitors.8 5 The appellate court rejected this holding, however,
on the grounds that all broadcasters were free to negotiate for a contract,
and the NCAA's "expulsion" sanction could not be considered a boycott
unless it was a sham for an anticompetitive purpose. 6 The Tenth Circuit
did not address the district court's further holding that the NCAA violated
section 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing the intercollegiate football
broadcasting market.
8 7
81. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1154 (citations omitted).
82. 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977). See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
83. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1316.
84. 546 F. Supp. at 1316; 707 F.2d at 1159-60.
85. 546 F. Supp. at 1311-12.
86. 707 F.2d at 1160-61.
87. 546 F. Supp. at 1292-93, 1319-23.
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Judge Barrett dissented from the Tenth Circuit's decision, arguing that
the per se rule was inapplicable and that the television restraints were justified
as necessary to maintain college football as an amateur sport.n Preliminarily,
the dissent took issue with the trial court's characterization of college football
as "a business operated by professionals to maximize revenue and minimize
expense",8 9 and the district court's failure to recognize or address the non-
commercial purposes and objectives of the NCAA:
[Tihe NCAA television plan's primary purpose is not anti-competitive.
Rather it is designed to further the purposes and objectives of the NCAA,
which are to maintain intercollegiate football as an amateur sport and
an adjunct of the academic endeavors of the institutions. One of the key
purposes is to insure that the student athlete is fully integrated into
academic endeavors. These are the "redeeeming virtues" which did not
impress the trial court or the majority. They are so compelling ... that
under the "rule of reason" analysis the public interest and that of the
parties is served by sustaining the restraint as reasonable.-
The dissent noted that all reported cases applying the per se rule "have
involved true competitive business enterprises operating in the interstate
market where the goal is exclusively that of seeking a profit from the product
or service offered to the public." 9' NCAA television contracts do not fall
within this category "because they are not designed to render the greatest
profit for a business purpose. "92 Rather, the restraints ensure that colleges
confine programs "within the principles of amateurism so that intercollegiate
athletics supplement, rather than inhibit, academic achievement. " 93 In ad-
dition to amateurism, the NCAA television restraints "promote competition
and enhance viewership," because they increase live attendance at games.9 4
Given the noncommercial legitimate goals of the NCAA, the dissent con-
cluded, the television controls did not violate the antitrust laws.
B. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts that the
NCAA's television plan and contracts unreasonably restrained trade because
the restraints limited "output" and eliminated price competition among
individual schools, without enhancing overall competition for the televising
of college football. 9S In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the lower
courts' more extreme conclusion that the plan and contracts were per se
88. 707 F.2d at 1162-68.
89. Id. at 1163.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1167 (emphasis in original).
92. Id. (emphasis in original).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1167-68.
95. 104 S. Ct. at 2959-60.
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violations of the Sherman Act, and instead employed a rule of reason
analysis.16 However, in both its decision to apply the rule of reason and in
its application of this rule, the Court effectively disregarded noneconomic
justifications for the television restraints and applied pure economic reasoning
to the NCAA plan.9 7
In explaining why it refused to condemn the NCAA television plan as a
per se violation of the antitrust laws, the Court acknowledged the nonecon-
omic goals of the NCAA, but expressly disclaimed any reliance on the
NCAA's status as a nonprofit organization or on the NCAA's efforts to
preserve and foster noneconomic educational goals as the basis for its de-
cision. 9 Nonprofit status, the Court noted, does not exempt from antitrust
liability a nonprofit entity engaged in anticompetitive conduct. 99 Moreover,
the Court stated,
[tihe economic significance of the NCAA's nonprofit character is ques-
tionable at best. Since the District Court found that the NCAA and its
member institutions are in fact organized to maximize revenues ... it
is unclear why petitioner is less likely to restrict output in order to raise
revenues above those that could be realized in a competetive market than
would be a for-profit entity."'
As for the NCAA's role in preserving and encouraging intercollegiate amateur
athletics, the Court recognized that "as the guardian of an important Amer-
ican tradition, the NCAA's motives must be accorded a respectful pre-
sumption of validity . *... 01 Nevertheless, the Court concluded "it is ...
well-settled that good motives will not validate an otherwise anticompetitive
practice' 102
"Critical" to the Court's decision to apply the rule of reason was that
the very nature of the industry rendered "horizontal restraints on competition
S.. essential if the product is to be available at all." 103 The product-college
football contests between competing institutions-could not be marketed,
the Court reasoned, absent mutual agreement among the colleges on a myriad
of rules, such as size of the playing field, number of players on a team,
and the extent of physical violence to be tolerated.1 4 Moreover, the unique
value of the NCAA's "product" arose from its amateur status and asso-
ciation with academic tradition; these economic attributes could be preserved
only through restraints on competition:
96. Id. at 2960-62.
97. See infra notes 99-119 and accompanying text.
98. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2960.
99. Id. at 2960 n.22 (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-87 (1975);
American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 576 (1982)).
100. Id. at 2960 n.22 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 2960 n.23.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2961.
104. Id.
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The identification of this "product" with an academic tradition differ-
entiates college football from and makes it more popular than profes-
sional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable . . . . In order
to preserve the character and quality of the "product," athletes must
not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like. And the
integrity of the "product" cannot be preserved except by mutual agree-
ment; if an institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its effec-
tiveness as a competitor on the playing field might soon be destroyed.
Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve
its character, and as a result enables a product to be marketed which
might otherwise be unavailable. In performing this role, its actions widen
consumer choice ... and hence can be viewed as procompetitive."°
Given the fact that even the respondents conceded that the great majority
of NCAA regulations enhanced competition, the Court determined that
"despite the fact that this case involves restraints on the ability of member
institutions to compete in terms of price and output, a fair evaluation of
their competitive character requires consideration of the NCAA's justifica-
tions for the restraints."'"
In applying the rule of reason, the Court did not examine the noneconomic
justifications for the NCAA television plan, but focused narrowly on whether
the restraints were sufficiently tailored to meet the NCAA's economic, pro-
competitive justifications. Initially, the Court rejected the NCAA argument
that, like the composers in Broadcast Music, it was engaged in a "joint
venture" which assisted in the marketing of broadcast rights and was there-
fore procompetitive. The Court accepted the factual finding of the district
court that the NCAA plan produced no economic efficiencies that enhanced
the competitiveness of college football television rights and that NCAA
football could be marketed just as effectively without the NCAA plan. °7
Thus, unlike Broadcast Music, the Court concluded that "it cannot be said
that 'the agreement on price is necessary to market the product at all' ". 10
Broadcast Music was further distinguished because in that case no limit was
placed on the volume that might be sold in the market and each individual
remained free to sell his own music without restraint.1°9
Second, the Court addressed the NCAA's argument that the television
restraints were necessary to protect live attendance at games not being tel-
evised. The Court noted that the plan in fact did not accomplish this purpose
since it provided for games to be shown on television during all hours that
live games were played." 0 However, stated the Court, "a more fundamental
reason for rejecting this defense" is that it "is not based on a desire to
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2962.
107. Id. at 2967.
108. Id. at 2967-68 (quoting Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23).




maintain the integrity of college football as a distinct and attractive product,"
but on the fear that live college football could not compete with televised
college football."1 The Court concluded that such a justification is not
acceptable because "the Rule of Reason does not support a defense based
on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable." '2
Finally, the Court agreed in part with the NCAA's argument that the
television regulations were justified by the need to maintain a competitive
balance among amateur athletic teams. Noting that its decision not to apply
a per se rule rested in large part on its recognition of the need for coop-
eration among member institutions to preserve the type of competition the
NCAA and its member colleges sought to market, the Court stated that "[iut
is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA
are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams
and therefore procompetitive because they enhance public interest in inter-
collegiate athletics.""' 3 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the television
restraints were "not even arguably tailored" to serve the NCAA's interest
in competitive balance: "The plan simply imposes a restriction on one source
of revenue that is more important to some colleges than to others ... [with-
out] produc[ing] any greater measure of equality throughout the NCAA. ' "4
Although rejecting television restraints as a means of preserving ama-
teurism and competitive balance, the Court suggested that other NCAA
regulations are well tailored for these purposes:
[A]s the District Court found, the NCAA imposes a variety of other
restrictions designed to preserve amateurism which are much better tai-
lored to the goal of competitive balance ... and which are 'clearly
sufficient' to preserve competitive balance to the extent it is within the
NCAA's power to do so. "
In its conclusion, the Court again acknowledged the need for restrictions
to preserve amateurism:
The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition
of amateurism in college sports. There can be no question but that it
needs ample latitude to play that role, or that the preservation of the
student-athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to inter-
collegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman
Act. But consistent with the Sherman Act, the role of the NCAA must
be to preserve a tradition that might otherwise die; rules that restrict
output are hardly consistent with this role. Today we hold only that...
111. Id. at 2969.
112. Id. (quoting National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 696).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2970.
115. Id. at 2970 (quoting NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1296, 1309-10).
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by curtailing output and blunting the ability of member institutions to
respond to consumer preference, the NCAA has restricted rather than
enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation's life." 6
Despite the Court's language quoted above, praising the goals of ama-
teurism, the Court in NCAA considered amateurism to be relevant only
insofar as it fit within the Court's purely economic analysis of the challenged
restraint. Although the majority did not expressly reject a role for non-
economic justifications in all cases, such justifications played no role in its
analysis in NCAA. In contrast, the dissenters disagreed sharply with this
approach.
Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented in NCAA primarily
on the ground that the NCAA's television plan promoted the legitimate
noneconomic goal of "preserving amateurism and integrating athletics and
education." " 7 The importance of this goal, in the dissenters' view, overrode
any minimal anticompetitive impact the NCAA plan might have on televised
college football.
According to the dissent, the majority erred in treating NCAA athletics
"as a purely commercial venture in which colleges and universities participate
solely, or even primarily, in the pursuit of profits."", To the contrary, "[t]he
NCAA... 'exist[s] primarily to enhance the contribution made by amateur
athletic competition to the process of higher education as distinguished from
realizing maximum return on it as an entertainment commodity.' ""9 Thus,
the NCAA seeks to provide a "public good" that could not be provided in
a perfectly competitive market:
By mitigating what appears to be a clear failure of the free market to
serve the ends and goals of higher education, the NCAA ensures the
continued availability of a unique and valuable product, the very existence
of which might well be threatened by unbridled competition in the eco-
nomic sphere.'2
Additionally, the dissent took issue with the Court's conclusion that the
NCAA television restraints differed fundamentally from the numerous other
NCAA controls (e.g., student eligibility rules, limits on compensation to
student athletes, and limits on the number of coaches a school can hire)
which are intended "to keep university athletics from becoming profession-
116. Id. at 2971 (emphasis in original).
117. Id. at 2973. See generally 104 S. Ct. at 2971-73, 2977-79. The dissenters also took issue
with the district court's findings that the NCAA plan limited total output and created a
noncompetitive price structure unresponsive to viewer demand. Id. at 2975-76.
118. Id. at 2971.
119. Id. at 2971-72 (quoting Assocation for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. NCAA,
558 F. Supp. 487, 494 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 577 (1984)).
120. Id. at 2972.
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alized to the extent that profit making objectives would overshadow edu-
cational objectives." '' 21
The dissent strongly disagreed with the lower courts' refusal to consider
the noneconomic justifications urged by the NCAA in support of its television
controls: "[I]t is important to remember that the Sherman Act 'is aimed
primarily at combinations having commercial objectives and is applied only
to a very limited extent to organizations ... which normally have other
objectives.' "122
The dissent further contended that the lower courts erred in interpreting
Professional Engineers to preclude reliance on noneconomic factors in ana-
lyzing the television restraints-an error that the Court had not "in so many
words" repeated. 23 Although statements in Professional Engineers could be
broadly read to suggest that the noneconomic justifications urged by the
NCAA could not save the NCAA television plan from invalidation under
the Sherman Act,
these statements were made in response to "public interest" justifications
... in defense of a ban on competitive bidding imposed by practitioners
engaged in standard, profit-motivated commercial activities. The pri-
marily noneconomic values pursued by educational institutions differ
fundamentally from the "overriding commercial purpose of [the] day-
to-day activities" of engineers, lawyers, doctors, and businessmen .. .
and neither Professional Engineers nor any other decision of this Court
suggests that associations of nonprofit educational institutions must de-
fend their self-regulatory restraints solely in terms of their competitive
impact, without regard for the legitimate noneconomic values they pro-
mote."'
When the noneconomic goals of the NCAA are considered, the dissent
concluded, the NCAA's plan was reasonable in that it "foster[ed] the goal
of amateurism by spreading revenues among various schools and reduc[ed]
the financial incentives toward professionalism."125 These contributions, the
dissent reasoned, "sufficient[ly] ...offset any minimal anticompetitive ef-
fects of the television plan." 26
CONCLUSION
The courts suggested in early cases that the assertion of noncommercial
121. Id. (quoting Kupec v. Atlantic Coast Conference, 399 F. Supp. 1377, 1380 (M.D.N.C.
1975)).
122. 104 S. Ct. at 2977 (quoting Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207,
213 n.7 (1959)).
123. 104 S. Ct. at 2978.
124. Id. (quoting Gulland, Byrne & Steinbach, Intercollegiate Athletics and Television Con-
tracts: Beyond Economic Justifications in Antitrust Analysis of Agreements Among Colleges,
52 FORDHAM L. REv. 717, 728 (1984)).
125. Id. at 2978.
126. Id. at 2979.
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objectives in defense of anticompetitive behavior would exempt the chal-
lenged behavior from the antitrust laws. Subsequently, it became clear that
noneconomic or noncommercial considerations would not exempt anticom-
petitive conduct from antitrust scrutiny. The question then became whether
the presence of such considerations automatically would call the iule of
reason into play. Read literally, Professional Engineers sugggested that they
would not. The NCAA decision, however, leaves this question open because
the Court, while specifically not relying on educational considerations and
the goal of amateurism, did use "noncommercial considerations" as part
of its economic analysis in deciding to apply the rule of reason. Subsequent
cases have followed NCAA in this regard. 27
Assuming that the rule of reason is to be applied, either because the
challenged restraint falls within an "exception" to the per se rule or because
the rule of reason is otherwise appropriate, the question of the proper weight
to be accorded to noncommercial factors in that analysis remains unan-
swered. Again, the decision in Professional Engineers suggests that noncom-
mercial factors should not be considered as part of the rule of reason analysis
because only competitive considerations are relevant. This conclusion is
unlikely to be taken literally, however-even the NCAA decision gave non-
commercial factors some deference. For example, noneconomic considera-
tions may be used to define a relevant market or otherwise to define a
unique "product" or the economic character of an industry.
At the very least, to withstand antitrust scrutiny, the challenged restraint
must be reasonably related to the asserted noncommercial goal. A more
substantial anticompetitive impact will require a more tenable link between
the restraint and the noncommercial justification. Similarly, the greater the
number of noncommercial justifications that can be applied to a given
restraint, the greater the likelihood that the courts will find a way to uphold
it.
127. In Cha-Car, Inc. v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 752 F.2d 609, 614 n.9 (l1th Cir. 1985),
the court recognized a "sports regulation exception" which "generally applies in a situation
where a regulatory organization sets forth rules and procedures essential to the existence of or
survival of a sport." Similarly, in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. American Broad-
casting Co., 747 F.2d 511, 516-18 (9th Cir. 1984), the court referred to the "essential entity
argument" of NCAA and decided that per se analysis of the challenged agreement was ap-
propriate because, unlike the challenged agreement in NCAA, this agreement was not essential
to the nature of college football. See also Ashley Meadows Farm v. American Horse Shows
Ass'n, 609 F. Supp. 677, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (challenged rules analyzed under the rule of
reason because, as in NCAA, the rules were necessary "to guarantee the continued quality of
horse competition").
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